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Wadlington: Shotgun Marriage by Operation of Law

SHOTGUN MARRIAGE BY OPERATION
OF LAW
Walter Wadlington*
A CCORDING to present notion, a marriage requires the free,
.voluntary consent of two legally competent persons.1 Translated,
this means simply that if Sam goes through a marriage ceremony with
Milgrig only because her father is standing behind him with a loaded
firing piece pointed menacingly in his direction, Sam can have the
marriage annulled by a court if he acts to do so as soon as the obvious
duress ceases and before he has "ratified" the marriage by unenforced
cohabitation. The so-called "shotgun marriage" has thus contributed
to appellate court reports in some states2 as well as to the substantial
repertoire of traveling salesman jokes.
From a standpoint of social policy, the preceding approach would
seem to indicate that the state's chief concern is to insure the stability
of marriage by discouraging unions solely to vindicate ruffled family
honor, or to punish one or both parties for indulging in premarital
intercourse. This is borne out by the fact that the result of the annulment action generally would not have been different simply because
Milgrig and Sam had isolated or continuous sexual intercourse before
the enforced ceremony; nor would the cause be affected by the fact that
Milgrig had yielded to Sam's advances only because he promised to
marry her, or that Milgrig was pregnant by Sam at the time of the
ceremony. 3 This is not to say that the state might not have some
Professor of Law, University of Virginia, .B. 1951, Duke; LL.B. 1954, Tulane.
1 The word "notion" is used calculatedly because we are not alhays sure just how

marriage is defined. For example, there is even a confusion of terminology between the

act of mariying and the relationship created thereby. Some states have no formal definition of marriage in their statutes but nevertheless detail various formalities which may or
may not be necessary for achieving marital status. Probably the definition in widest use
in this country today, with but slight variations, is that of Lord Penmne, who termed
it "the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all
others." Hyde v. Hyde (1866), LR. 1 P. & D. 130, 133. (Emphasis added.)
2 See, e.g., Burney v. State, 111 Tex. 599, 13 S.W.2d 375 (1929); Lee v. Lee, 176 Ark.
636, 3 S.W.2d 672 (1928). It is not actually necessary that there be a shotgun or other
weapon at the scene of the wedding; communication beforehand of a threat such as
"you have ruined my daughter and I am going to kill you if you don't marry her," will
amount to sufficient duress to permit an annulment if the male's acts are motivated by
fear that the threat will be carried out. See Cannon v. Cannon, 7 Tenn. App. 19 (1928).
3 There does seem to be a more demanding proof requirement where seduction,
pregnancy or continued sexual relations are found to exist. See, e.g., Kelly v. Kelly. 206
Ala. 334, 89 So. 508 (1921) (dear, satisfactory and convincing); Shepherd v. Shepherd.
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interest in preventing or penalizing the particular conduct concerned;
it is simply to point up the idea that enforced marriage should not be
the device by which state interests are protected.
If this were the policy approach consistently followed by the various
states, then the present article would be unnecessary. But what is
actually happening seems to contradict the thesis that marriage requires,
free and voluntary consent by the parties. In the guise of protecting the
state's interests in the courtship process or regulating sexual relations
outside of marriage, a not-so-subtle use of criminal sanctions has served
to force marriage in a number of instances, including some of those just
mentioned. Such an approach can best be characterized as "shotgun
marriage by operation of law." But because the state's duress, unlike
4
that of Milgrig's father, is legal, no annulment action is available.
This raises the serious question of whether we are departing from the
basic community goal of marital stability in the process of attempting
to protect certain ill-defined individual interests.
The legal shotgun approach centers on criminal statutes which penalize fornication and seduction-particularly the latter-which have increased greatly in importance since the restriction or elimination of
civil actions for breach of promise to marry by "anti-heart balm"
statutes in a substantial number of jurisdictions. The very existence
of criminal statutes on fornication may lead to marriage as a convenience to avoid possible embarrassment if not severe punishment for
both parties; this possibility is growing with the present lackadaisical
attitude toward premarital sexual intercourse. The statutes on seduction, with their emphasis on the wrongdoing of one party only, are
susceptible to many of the same abuses which lead to passage of the
anti-heart balm statutes. But the stake in a criminal action for seduction
more often is personal liberty rather than money alone. What makes
the seduction statutes serve most effectively as an injunction to marry
is the widespread provision that marriage between the parties will be
a defense to further criminal prosecution. To a very limited degree,
174 Ky. 615, 192 S.W. 658 (1917) (presumption of consensual marriage rebutted only by
very convincing evidence).
4 See Rogers v. Rogers, 151 Miss. 644, 118 So. 619 (1928). In Rogers this rule is carried
to its extreme. Although the defendant in this case married in order to escape prosecution, he was evidently acting under the mistaken advice that the penalty on conviction
would be hanging.
5 The above is almost an inevitability under our present frenetic courtship process
which appears to be influenced chiefly by the availability of automobiles and by guldelines
for mating conduct laid down by television or cinema rather than through home, church
or school.
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marriage also has been made a defense to fornication and, in some
jurisdictions, to bastardy or rape. A general examination of the law
dealing with fornication and seduction, and then of the defense of
marriage, is thus necessary before the effective range of the legal shotgun may be determined.
FORNICATION

Not a common law crime, fornication,0 was dealt with by the ecclesiastical courts in England.7 Christian concern over fornication is sometimes considered to stem in large measure from the invocation of Saint
Paul in the New Testament that: "to avoid fornication, let every man
have his own wife, and let every woman have her own husband." s In
the same chapter of his First Letter to the Corinthians he added: "I say
therefore to the unmarried and widows, It is good for them if they
abide even as I. But if they cannot contain, let them marry: for it is
better to marry than to burn."9
It is suspected that the Pauline language influenced the provision of
the Connecticut Blue Laws of 1650 which stated that if a man should
commit fornication with a single woman both might "bee punished,
either by injoyning to marriage, or fyne, or corporall punishment, or
all, or any of these, as the Courte or magistrates shall appoint, most
agreeable to the word of God."'10 Similar provisions appeared elsewhere
in the colonies, though not all included the injunction to marry.21
Laws punishing fornication appeared in state statutory compilations
soon after independence; and it was at about this time or shortly before
2
that the provision for corporal punishment disappeared from them.1
6 Fornication is defined as unlawful sexual intercourse between unmarried persons.
7 See 2 PoLLocK & AirILAND, TnE HISoRY OF ENGLISH LAw 542 (Ist ed. 1895). If the
conduct were open and notorious, however, it might fall within the scope of IeVdneS
and thus be punishable by the temporal courts. See 4 BLAcrsroNE, CoMI,-uARIES * 65.
8 1 Corinthians 7:2 (King James).
9 Id. at 7: 8, 9.
10 Connecticut Blue Laws of 1650, at 48 (Hartford: William Andrus, 1942). (Emphasis
added.)
11 An 1859 Pennsylvania case quotes an almost identical provision, calling it one of
the earliest laws of William Penn. See Barnett v. Kimmell, 35 Pa. 13, 21 (1859).
Fornication was grouped with certain other punishable "odious sinnes" in a 1657
Virginia statute. 1 Laws of Va. 433 (Hening 1809). It was dealt with more specifically
(as the "filthy sin of fornication') in the laws of 1661-62. 2 Laws of Va. 115 (Hening 1823).
12 The compilation of Delaware laws in 1797, gives an illustration of this shift in
another state than Connecticut. Whipping is provided as a punishment for fornication
in 1 Laws of Del. ch. 44, § 3, at 105-06 (1797). But corporal punishment as well as fine
or forfeiture were eliminated for bastardy or fornication by another provision in 2
Laws of Del., ch. 108, §§ 7-8, at 1307 (1797).
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It would seem noteworthy that Edward Livingston's famous Code of
Crimes and Punishments13 contained no sanction against fornication;
the Introductory Report pointed out that "the private excess of passion
between the sexes cannot,.with propriety, be made the subject of penal
law ... ."14 However, this otherwise influential work evidently did not
serve as an effective model for the states in this regard.
Today corporal punishment is considered by many, as "cruel and
unusual" or, at the very least, undesirable; thus it has disappeared for
the most part from state criminal statutes.10 Probably an injunction to
marry delivered to a couple who have experienced sexual relations
with no thought of or desire for marriage often will more nearly
approximate the "cruel and unusual" than ten or twenty stripes on
the bare back. But the courts have not had to face this dilemma because
it is generally considered that they have no power to order a marriage
(although the statutes may proffer marriage as an alternative to judicially imposed incarceration). 17 In any event, thirty-six states presently
specify other criminal sanctions against fornication.' 8 Within this
V

13 Livingston's penal code was never enacted by the legislature of the State of Louisiana, which commissioned it. See 1 LIVINGSTON, WORKS ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE 1-4
(1873). But the work did serve a model for criminal law reform elsewhere, both here
and abroad, after its publication in 1833. The general movement toward penal codes soon
afterward made the concept of common law crimes much less important. See RADIN,
HANDBOOK OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 246 (1936).
14 1 Livingston, op. cit. supra note 13, at 286.
15 Delaware, for example, eliminated the penalty in cases of fornication and bastardy
quite early but retains whipping as a sanction for certain other acts. See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, §§ 3905-08 (1953); State v. Cannon, 190 A.2d 514 (Del. 1963). The Delaware
statutes do provide for reduction or omission in some cases involving those of "tender
years," see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3905 (1953). A special provision provides fairly severe
sanctions against cameras at the whipping post, for whatever consolation that may be
worth. Id. § 411.
16 A federal statute bans both whipping and standing in the pillory as punishment
for federal criminal violations. See 18 U.S.C. § 3564 (1964).
17 See text accompanying notes 62-82, infra.
18 ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 16 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 11.40.040 (1962); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-222 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-805 (1964); COLO. RV. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-3 (1953);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-219 (1960); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 798.03 (1965); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 26-5801 (1953); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6603 (1947); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-8 (SmithHurd 1963); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4207 (1956); IAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-118 (1964); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 436.070 (1955); ME. REV. STAT. ANN., ch. 17, § 1551 (1954); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN., ch. 272, § 18 (1959); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.16 (1964); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 1998, 1999
(1956); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-4107 (1947); NED. REV. STAT. § 28-928 (1964); NEV.
Rv. STAT. § 201.200 (1963); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 579:4 (1955); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:
110-11 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (1951); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-22-08 (1960); OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 2905.08-13 (Page 1953); OR. REv. STAT. § 167.030 (1963); PA. STAT. ANN., tit.
18, § 4506 (1963); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-6-3 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-406, 408
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group, however, there are differences concerning whether a single act
of intercourse is punishable or whether actual cohabitation between
the parties is required; 19 the distinction seems based on a differentiation between private or clandestine and open or notorious conduct.
The majority proscribe any such sexual intercourse, regardless of its
nature, public or private.
The penalties presently imposable for fornication vary greatly between states, 20 but usually they are far less severe than those which can
be meted out for seduction. 21 Rhode Island, which offers what is perhaps an extreme example, provides for a maximum of ten dollars fine
for fornication22 while seduction is punishable with imprisonment of
up to five years.23 Several states with fornication statutes, however, have
a sliding scale under which the punishment can be increased for the
24
second or third offense.
In the Proposed Official Draft of the American Law Institute's
MODEL PENAL CODE, consensual, non-deviate sexual intercourse between adults is not made a crime.2 5 But as yet there has been no rush
by state legislatures to repeal the fornication laws presently on their
books.
SEDucTION

Like fornication, seduction was not a crime at common law. -0 Nor
did it achieve widespread statutory recognition as a criminal offense
(1962); Tx. PEN. CODE, arts. 503, 504 (1948); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-53-5 (1953); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 18.1-188, 190 (1950); WASH. Rav. CODE ANN §§ 9.79.020-030 (1961); IV. VA. CODE
ANN. § 6058 (1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 944.15 (1958); WVYo. STAT. ANN. § 6.86 (1957).

A number of the preceding statutes have the double function of proscribing both
fornication and adultery.
19 Statutes requiring cohabitation, in the sense of a living together rather than an
isolated act of intercourse are found in Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Kansas, and Nevada.
In addition to its fornication statute, Utah has a separate provision dealing with the
broader offense of cohabitation. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-53-2 (1953).
20 For a comparison of the penalty ranges in the various statutes which were in
effect fifteen years ago, see HA"ER, PROBEt-IS OF THE FAMILY 83-86 (1952). The statutes
have seen relatively little change since that time.
21 An equivalent table to that mentioned in the preceding footnote, but dealing with
the seduction statutes, is found in Harper, op. cit. supra note 20, at 79-81.
22 R. GEN. LAws ANN. § 11-6-3 (1956).
23 RI. GEN. LAws ANN. § 11-37-4 (1956).
24 Statutes with such provision for harsher punishment on repeated offenses are found,
for example, in Alabama, Arkansas, and Colorado.
25 Section 213.3 of the Code does, however, include provisions concerning the corruption of minors along with seduction. The former more closely parallels present provisions
on statutory rape rather than fornication.
26 Unlike fornication, however, it does not seem to have been of independent concern
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until substantially later than did fornication.2 7 But the possibilities of
family vengeance or reparation which was a partial basis for making
seduction a crime did lead to early recognition of a need for some form
of judicial remedy. The common law supplied such a remedy in the
form of a tort action which was available to a guardian, parent or
master for loss of services to which he was entitled; 28 such parties would
not be affected by the maxim volenti non fit injuria as would the
seducee. The closest criminal action was abduction which, although not
involving any semblance of voluntariness on the part of the female,
was nevertheless concerned both with injury to family pride and loss
29
of chastity.
This country at first followed substantially in the English pattern.
Seduction was an action in tort to be brought by a parent per quod
seroitium amisit.80 Abduction was made criminal by statute in many
states.8 ' In addition, there was a civil action for breach of promise to
marry,8 2 and proof of intercourse in reliance on the promise might
to the ecclesiastical courts as an offense. But what might constitute the facts of a modern
day seduction (marriage promise followed by intercourse relying on it) would have been
of importance to such courts because of the doctrine that sponsalia per verba do futuro
followed by copulation brought about a marriage. See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, Tnu
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 366-67, 370-73 (1st ed. 1895). The concept of marriage
per verba de futuro cum copula was not acecpted in this country.
27 Pennsylvania dealt with what was described as the "great private and public wrong"
of seduction by statute as early as 1843 in an act which provided punishment for seduction
of a female under 21 and further provided that a civil action could be brought by the
mother of the seducee if the father were dead. See Pa. Laws 1843, No. 165, at 348. New
York also made seduction a criminal offense before the middle of the nineteenth century.
See N.Y. Sess. Laws 1848, ch. 111, § 1, at 148. A number of other states followed suit a
decade or so later. Oregon, for example, had a penal statute dealing with seduction (and
providing that marriage was a defense to the action) as early as 1864. ORE. CRaM. CODE,
ch. 7, § 647 (1864), in Laws of Ore. 1843-72, at 432.
28 See, e.g., 3 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 0140-41; PROSSER, ToRTS 906-08

(3d ed. 1964).
29 The crime of abduction, established by a series of early English statutes, has been
variously described as closely analogous to either kidnapping or rape. See CLARK &
MARSHAUL, C~iuams 700 (6th ed. Wingersky 1958). See generally id. 700-05.
80 The element of "loss of services" has become increasingly fictional with the passage
of time; the key now seems to be a showing that the person bringing the action would be
the one entitled to the seducee's services. As one commentator puts it, the element of
services "is a mere peg on which to hang the real damages." PROSSER, op. Cit. supra note
28, at 907.
81 See CLARK & MARSHALL, op. cit. supra note 29, at 700-01 for a discussion of the varying approaches taken by the statutes on abduction in this country. See also Foster &
Freed, Offenses Against the Family, 32 U. KAN. Crr L. REv. 33, 63-68 (1964).
32 For a general discussion of this action in "pre-heart balm statute" days, see White,
The Action for Breach of the MarriagePromise, 10 VA. L. REv. 361 (1924).
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increase damages. 33 Early in the nineteenth century it was also suggested in Livingston's penal code (which had not included fornication
as an offense) that seduction should be made criminal. 34 The drafter's
explanation was:
[I]f we consider the profligacy of the act, by which the most implicit confidence is betrayed and the most solemn promises are
deliberately broken, not only to the ruin of the unsuspecting
victim, but to the disgrace and misery of her connexions, it is one
in which the immorality of the act, and the misery which it inflicts, both require exemplary punishment.3 5
Whether the influence of Livingston's code was responsible is unclear,
but not long after its publication criminal statutes punishing seduction
began to appear with some frequency.30 Generally they referred, as did
the Livingston provision, only to seduction under promise to marry,
although in certain instances this was broadened to include seduction

under any form of deceit-or whatever is considered as falling within
the purview of "artful wiles."3 7 A few of the broader statutes are included among the laws of the thirty-six states38 which, along with the
33 Although the action for breach of promise to marry is categorized by many as being
in contrast, the plaintiff is often afforded the best of two worlds--contract and tortbecause she may be able to receive exemplary or punitive damages. See Brown, Breach
of Promise Suits, 77 U. PA. L. REv. 474, 483 (1929).
84 The text provided:
Whoever shall be guilty of SEDUCING a woman of good reputation under a
promise of marriage, and shall violate his promise, shall be fined not less than one
hundred nor more than one thousand dollars, or shall be imprisoned in dose
custody not less than one nor more than six months.
A Code of Crimes and Punishments, tit. XVI, ch. II, art. 342, in 2 Liv.NGsToN, op. cit. supra
note 13, at 96.
35 1 LIvINGsTON, op. ct. supra note 13, at 285.
36 The Livingston Code was completed in 1824 but not completely published until
1833 when a complete edition was printed at Philadelphia. As mentioned in note 27 supra,
Pennsylvania enacted a criminal seduction statute (though not as broad as Livingston's
provision) in 1843.
For a review of the criminal seduction statutes in this country in 1833, see Seduction
as a Crime, 3 Cam. LAw MAGAZNE 331 (1882).
37 For further early discussion on whether a promise to marry would be required, see
Humble, Seduction as a Crime, 21 CoLuar. L. Rxv. 144-46 (1921).
38 See ALA. CODE, tit. 14, § 419 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § IIA0.070 (19n; Amz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 13-202 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-3408 (1947); CAL. PEN. CODE § 268; CoLO. R'.
STAT. ANN. § 40-9-7 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-22'4 (1960); GA. CoDE ANN. § 266001 (1953); HAwAn REv. LAws § 309-33 (1955); IDnAo CODE ANN. § 18-5609 (1947); IND.
ANN. STAT. § 10-4208 (1956); IOWA CODE ANN. § 700.1 (1946); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-429
(1964); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 436.010 (1963); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.800 (1954); Mldim. STAT.
ANN. § 617.07 (1964); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2374 (1947); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 559.310 (1949);
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District of Columbia, 39 Virgin Islands, 40 Guam, 41 Puerto Rico 42 and

the Panama Canal Zone, 43 formally designate seduction as a crime. 44
As noted previously, the offense is usually considered as substantially
more serious than fornication; all states which have such proscriptions
provide for a possible jail term, with the Georgia penalty ceiling of
twenty years imprisonment the highest among them. 45
There is far more variation among statutes relating to seduction
than among those on fornication. In addition to differences concerning
whether an actual promise to marry is required, some states limit the
operation of their criminal statutes to instances in which the seducee
is below a certain age.46 One requires that she must become pregnant
as a result of the intercourse. 47 Still others have special provisions
governing seduction between guardian and ward or teacher and
pupil. 48 There is, however, general agreement that the seduced female 49
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-4108 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-927 (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2A: 142-1, 142-2 (1953); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-10-4 (1953); N.Y. PEN. LAw § 2175; N.C.

GEN. STAT. § 14-180 (1951); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-32-01 (1960); Omio REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2905.09 (1953); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 21, § 1120 (1951); ORE. REV. STAT. § 167.025 (1963);
PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, § 4510 (1963); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 11-37-4 (1956); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-405 (1962); S.D. CODE § 13.2901 (1939); TEX. PEN. CODE, art. 505 (1948); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.1-41 (1950); WASH. R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 9.79.070 (1961); Wvyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-62
(1957).
39 See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3001, 3002 (1961).
40 See V.. CODE ANN. § 14-1981 (1964).
41 See GUAM PENAL CODE § 269 (1960).
42 See PuERTO Rico LAws ANN. tit. 33, § 967 (1956).
43 See CANAL ZONE CODE tit. 6, § 2392 (1962).
44 A federal statute also proscribes seduction by any of an American vessel's personnel
during a voyage. 18 U.S.C. § 2198 (1964). The fine imposed under this provision may be
payable to the woman seduced or to her child if she has one. 18 U.S.C. § 3614 (1964).
45 See GA. CODE § 26-6001 (1933).
,
46 Approximately a dozen of the statutes have such an age provision. Usually they
apply if the seducee is below 21 or, in some cases, only if below 18.
47 The New Jersey statute contains such a limitation. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:142-2
(1951).
48 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3002 (1961).
49 It has been assumed generally that the seducee must be a female. However, in a
case dealing with a since repealed statute, the Supreme Court of Florida pointed out
in 1931 that:
the peculiar wording of the statute . . . suggests the idea that the legislature In its
exalted opinion of the male youth of the country conceived it to be possible that a
male youth under eighteen years of age might be seduced by an older designing

person of the opposite sex.
Blount v. State, 102 Fla. 1100, 1103, 138 So. 2, 3 (1931).
Although the court characterized the statute in question as one for seduction, It
appears that it actually was what we would today term statutory rape. However, the
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must be both unmarried and of previously chaste character,0 though
chastity will often be presumed in the absence of rebuttal evidence.51
The history of seduction actions in our country first as civil and only
later as criminal seems to reflect some ambivalence as to whether the
interests to be protected are chiefly public or private in nature. Another development reflecting this uncertainty was the rather late trend
toward adoption of statutes permitting the seduced female to bring an
action for damages in her own behalf. 52 Although this was not too far
removed from the hybrid contract-tort action for breach of promise in
which punitive damages might be awarded, in a breach of promise
action proof of intercourse was not necessary although it would be
considered in assessing an award.
Wide scale abuse of both civil actions-breach of promise and seduction-led several decades ago to their abolition or severe curtailment
(along with certain other actions) in a number of key states including
California, 53 Florida, 54 Michigan,55 New Jersey,5 New York, 7 and
Pennsylvania. 58 These sweeping moves were criticized by some who
regarded the particular actions as socially valuable if they were but
properly limited.5 9 The persuasiveness of such criticism could have been
bolstered by a consideration of the situation which would exist after
legislature dearly had substituted for "unmarried female" the larger phrase "unmarried
person of previous chaste character," thus leading to the previous observation.
50 Needless to say, the question of what amounts to chaste character has been widely
debated in the courts. Usually the question is whether the female must be virgo intacta
or must be of good reputation. It appears that a showing of bad reputation is not alone
enough to bar an action, although the original livingston provision quoted in note 34
supra was expressed in terms of reputation. For early debate on the question see Kenyon
v. People, 26 N.Y. 203, 84 Am. Dec. 177 (1863); Polk v. State, 40 Ark. 482 (1883). See
also Humble, supra note 37, at 146-47.
51 Virginia's seduction statute, for example, specifically provides for such a presumption in the absence of rebuttal evidence. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-41 (1960); see Britt v.
Commonwealth, 202 Va. 906, 121 S.E.2d 495 (1961).
52 For a discussion of these statutes, see Feinsinger, Legislative Attad on "HeartBalm,
33 MicH. L. Rxv. 979, 987-88 (1935).
53 CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.5.
54 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 771.01 (1964).
55 MicH. STAT. ANN. § 25.191 (1957).
56 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23-1 (1952).

57 N.Y. Civ.

RIGHTS

§ 80-a (Supp. 1966).

58 PA. STAT. ANN. tit 48, §§ 170-71 (1965).
59 See, e.g., 1 HARPER & JAfEs, ToRTs 628-29

(1956). For more detailed evaluation of

the heart balm legislation in a number of states, see Brockelbank, The Nature of the
Promise to Marry-A Study in Comparative Law, 41 ILL. L RE,. 1, 199 (1946); Feinsinger, supra note 52; Note, Avoidance of the Incidence of The Anti.Heartbalm Statutes,
52 COLUm. L. REv. 242 (1952).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1967

9

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [1967], Art. 3

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1: 183

the elimination of the civil actions. Remaining substantially alone in
a number of states would be the criminal action for seduction; prosecutions under it by aggrieved females who formerly might have sought
redress in a private action were likely to increase. It also meant a
complete historical turnabout: what had long been considered exclusively a private matter was now to be dealt with only in a criminal
context. Evidently few looked at the matter in this perspective; if more
had done so, it is possible that even the criminal statutes might have
been eliminated. Fortunately, they are to some degree protected from
the more flagrant abuses of the civil actions because of fairly general
requirements of corroboration.06 Also, courts have indicated a reluctance to expand the scope of criminal seduction through interpretation;
indeed, there apparently is a tendency toward narrow construction.01
This is roughly the situation which exists today, although it should
be noted that the American Law Institute has proposed a change which
would at least limit the scope of the action for seduction as we presently know it. The Proposed Official Draft of the MODEL PENAL CODE,
provides that: "A *male who has intercourse with a female not his
wife ... is guilty of an offense if... the other person is a female who
is induced to participate by a promise of marriage which the actor does
not mean to perform." 62 According to the commentary on this provision, 63 the purpose of requiring a false promise is to limit the scope
so as to avoid prosecutions involving couples who are engaged in good
faith, who have sexual intercourse during the engagement, but who
terminate their engagement before marriage. Marriage itself is not
60 For a tabulation of statutes requiring corroboration, see HARPER, PRO1LEMS OF TIE
FAmY 79-81 (1952).
61 For an illustration of recent judicial construction narrowly interpreting an apparently broad statute, see Britt v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 906, 121 S.E.2d 495 (1961). The
court indicated that a conditional promise to marry only in the event that the female
became pregnant as a result of the intercourse was not the type of marriage promise
to which prosecution under the statute should be directed. Under such circumstances it
considered that the dominating force which induced the prosecutrix to yield was not the
promise to marry but a desire to avoid the consequences of pregnancy. It was also noted
that there was a problem of corroboration.
62 MODEL PENAL CODE

63 MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 213.3(1) and § 213.3(1)(d) (Prop. Off. Draft 1962).
§ 207A, comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) at 257-65. The

commentary notes that:
The text is unique in requiring that the promise of marriage be made in bad faith,
thus adhering to our general policy of punishing imposition rather than private
immorality. The provision will also help to differentiate the case of premarital
intercourse between engaged couples from the case of the Lothario who may be de.
ceiving a series of girls with false promises of marriage.
Id. at 259.
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made a defense to an action under the section, although prior promis4
cuous conduct of the female is so designated.
Other actions which are in some manner similar to either fornication
or seduction, or both, should be mentioned briefly before discussing
marriage as a defense because in some states these other actions may
serve a similar purpose in terms of promoting or provoking marriage.
These are statutory rape (in which the age of the female makes consent irrelevant to the legality of intercourse or the possibility of prosecution),6 5 bastardy or getting a woman with child.
MARRIAGE AS A DEFENSE

Of the forty-one jurisdictions which make seduction a crime, some
thirty-five provide that marriage, or sometimes simply a renewed offer
to marry, will serve as a defense. 0 At least four also extend the defense
of marriage to fornication prosecutions,67 and there are several jurisdictions which permit its use in prosecutions for statutory rape s
bastardy, 69 or adultery.70 Although the defense is most often found in
statutory law, in a number of states it has emerged through judicial
64 The position of the drafters with regard to marriage as a defense is dicussed at
the text to note 25 supra. The defense of prior promiscuity is found in the MODEL PENAL
CODE § 213.6(4) (Prop. Off. Draft, 1962).
65 The provisions on statutory rape are frequently grouped with criminal seduction
and treated as closely analogous in some states. See, e.g., Blount v. State, 102 Fla. 1100,
1103, 138 So. 2, 3 (1931), discussed in note 49 supra.
66 These include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Georgia,
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia and Washington (all states), along with the Canal Zone, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
Some of the states (including Pennsylvania, Illinois and Indiana) have introduced the
defense judicially rather than legislatively. It is therefore possible, and even probable,
that other states would apply such a defense if the issue were squarely presented to
them. It would seem that Wyoming (which has a statute patterned after Indiana's and
includes cases from the latter in its annotated code) would be most likely to take such
approach. Mention should also be made of the federal statute proscribing seduction at
sea. See note 44 supra. Marriage is a defense to this crime also. 18 U.S.C. § 2198 (1964).
67 Colorado, Georgia, Montana, North Dakota, and possibly Idaho are in this category.
68 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-26 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-45 (1960).
69 MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 273, § 17 (1959); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 345 (1958) (merely
says if woman "is married before she is delivered of child").
70 CoLo. REv. STATS. 40-9-3 (1963); MoNT. REv. CODEs ANN. § 94-4107 (1947); GA. CODE
ANN. § 26-5801 (1953).
Illinois formerly provided by statute that marriage between the parties would be a
defense in an adultery action but this was eliminated in 1961. See ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 38,
Committee Comments to § 11-7 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
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construction; 71 in fact, one of the earliest cases dealing with marriage
as a defense to seduction is found in a state whose statutes were silent
72
on the subject.
There are widely varying rules as to whether the marriage or offer
to marry which will serve as a defense to a seduction prosecution must
occur before arraignment 7s or pleading,74 before trial,"5 before the jury
is sworn, 76 before the jury verdict,77 or before judgment,7 8 or whether
it will be sufficient if it takes place after conviction. D In all cases, the
basic purpose seems to be the same; the question at issue is how closely
the game can be equated to Russian roulette or, in more diplomatic
terms, the amount of "brinksmanship" in which the accused is allowed
to indulge.
Some states provide that the defense of marriage does not serve as
an absolute bar to prosecution but either suspends it for a given period
71 See note 66 supra.

Commonwealth v. Eicher, 4 Clark (Pa. L.J. Rep.) 326 (1848).
CAL. PEN. CODE § 269 (before "finding of an indictment or the filing of an Information changing such offense').
74 GA.CODE § 26-6002 (1933); Tx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 506 (1952).
75 Aaxz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-202 (1956); N. M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-10-4 (1964).
76 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 559.310 (1949).
77 N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-32-02 (1960) provides that a good faith offer to marry will
be a defense if made before the case is submitted to the jury. However, a marriage between the parties will be a defense if it takes place at any time before conviction of the
defendant.
78 IowA CODE ANN. § 700.2 (1950); Ky. R v. STAT. § 436.010 (1963); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12-32-02 (1960); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.79.070 (1961).
79 It seems to be generally accepted that the marriage or offer to marry should occur
before conviction, and such a construction would seem implicit in the form of statute
which says simply that "marriage is a defense." See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1121
(1958). However, in one case an appellate court held that the trial court should have
granted defendant's motion for a continuance until after his divorce became final, so
that he would be able to marry the female who had been abducted and use this as a
defense. The court pointed out in Lee v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 528, 127 S.E. 170
(1925) that
the state encourages matrimony. In those cases even where decent public sentiment
has been outraged and the denounced crimes of seduction and abduction have been
committed, the statute provides that the subsequent marriage of the culprits shall
bar further prosecution of the criminal. However reprehensible the conduct of this
defendant . . . the commonwealth by statute opens a door and offers him a place for
penitence. He had not yet sinned away his days of grace ....
Id. at 171.
The sermon was changed back to a judicial opinion with the statement that
this is not to say that a man already married has an absolute right to a continuance
upon expressing his wish to marry the other woman .... The circumstances of each
case must control.
72
73
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(perhaps until the prosecutrix reaches a certain age) s0 or until the
happening of an event such as abandonment by the accused. 8 ' The
maximum sentence which can be imposed on revival or renewal of the
action may in such instances be greater than was possible at the time
of the original indictment.8 2 Still another variation on this approach
is to require the posting of a bond to guarantee support of the prosecutrix for a given period in the event that the accused leaves within
83
that time.
In the absence of a specific provision for suspension rather than
dismissal of the indictment, it seems that a ceremony alone will be
sufficient to meet the requirement of a statute which makes marriage a
bar to further prosecution. Such a rule has been applied even though
there was no cohabitation between the husband and his expediently obtained spouse immediately after the ceremony. 84 Although it is arguable that in such an instance the female partner should seek an annulment based on fraud (if she can establish that he never intended to
fulfill any of his duties as a husband), it is doubtful that the courts
would at her petition dissolve the marriage which she in effect forced.
And at least one court has held that even an annulled marriage satisfied
the language of a statute which provided simply that marriage would
be a defense to seduction. 85 In general, the courts point out that while
they' do not condone the conduct of the male who marries to avoid
prosecution and then abandons his spouse, they consider that something
desirable has been achieved if only by making the male honor his
80 Ky. R V. STAT. § 436.010 (1963) (three year suspension during which husband must
not desert or abandon); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-45 (1960) (carnal knowledge of a female

between 14 and 16 with consent continuable until she reaches age 16 unless husband
deserts before that time); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.79.070 (1961).
81 IoWa CODE ANN. § 700.3 (1950); MIci. CoMip. LAWs 750.164 (19.18); OmK. STAT. AN,.
tit. 21, § 1122 (1958); TaX. PEN . CODE ANN. art. 507 (1961).
The Texas provision has been upheld by the courts of that State against attacks based
both on double jeopardy and cruel and inhuman punishment. See Schneider v. State,
105 Tex. Crim. 1, 285 S.W. 323 (1926); Thacker v. State, 62 Tex. Crim. 294, 186 S.W. 1095
(1911).
82 OEI.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1120 (1958) provides for penitentiary imprisonment for a

period not to exceed five years in cases of seduction, while § 1122 of the same title provides
that the penalty for abandonment or intolerable cruelty which causes the wife to leave
within two years after a marriage which took place between .the parties pending a seduction charge may vary from two to twenty years of penitentiary confinement.
83 See GA. CODE § 26-6002 (1933).

84 See Burney v. State, 111 Tex. Crim. Rep. 599, 13 S.W.2d 375 (1929); cf. Eichar v.
Kistler, 14 Pa. (2 Harris) 282 (1850) (same result with regard to defense not stated in a
statute).
85 Burney v. State, supra note 84.
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broken promise to go through a marriage ceremony and thereby (in
some judicial eyes, at least) retrieve some of the wronged female's lost
honor.8 6 More important than this type of consideration, it would seem,
are the economic consequences. In cases where the male cannot annul,
he is bound to support his spouse and, if he gives her cause for divorce,
she may be able to obtain an alimony award. Thus an action for annul87
ment on her part might be self-defeating from a financial standpoint.
THE

PURPOSE OF THE DEFENSE AS EXPLAINED BY THE COURTS

Although the statutes which provide that marriage is a defense to
seduction or certain other actions generally contain no formal declaration of the legislative purpose which prompted their enactment, examination of the judicial opinions construing them reveals that the courts
have filled any gap which might have existed. The cases in which this
has been accomplished most effectively have been for the most part
those in which there has been an issue over questions such as the
existence of an impediment to the marriage at the time of the seduction, or the question of what is to be done when the seducer stands
ready to go through with a marriage ceremony but the seducee refuses,
or the problem of defining the last point in time when, the seducer
should be allowed to avail himself of the defense, or precisely ihat
constitutes a marriage under the terms of a statute which simply says
that marriage will be a defense.
Commonwealth v. Wright8s provides a good example of how the
judicial view of the purpose of the statutes can be found in a reaction
to the seducee's failure to accept the seducer's renewed offer to marry
regardless of whether it was made simply to avoid prosecution. The
defendant, accused of seducing a minor female below age sixteen, stated
to the court when the case was called for trial that his earlier offer to
marry the prosecutrix had been refused and that he wished to renew
his offer in the presence of the girl's parents. When it was refused again
by both the girl and her mother, he moved for a dismissal which was
granted by the court. The state then appealed in order to obtain an
interpretation of the statute, which stated that marriage of the parties
was a defense to such a. prosecution but did not mention disregarded
86 For illustrations of such a judicial attitude, see People v. Gould, 70 Mich. 2,10, 38
N.W. 232 (1888); State v. Otis, 135 Ind. 267, 34 N.E. 954 (1893).
87 This will also depend, however, on whether the state in which the annulment is
obtained has provided by statute for alimony after such a dissolution.
88 16 Ky. L. Rep. 251, 27 SA. 815 (1894).
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offers to marry. The dismissal was affirmed in an opinion which first
defined the purpose of the defense and then reconciled the extension
of the statute to include such an offer with this purpose. The court
pointed out that
the statute was enacted for the protection of the pure, innocent,
and inexperienced woman who may be led astray from the paths
of rectitude and virtue by the arts and wiles of the seducer under
promise of marriage, by compelling him to marry her, or suffer
the penalty of the law. Its primary object is to compel the seducer
to marry his victim, so that she be not further degraded, and perhaps lost, through her shame, but rather that she be saved by wifehood, and that the issue, if any born or to be born of the illicit
intercourse, be made legitimate, instead of being bastardized.89
Elsewhere in the opinion, the court indicated that it considered marriage under certain circumstances almost wholly in terms of a sanction
insofar as the male was concerned. They stated, with regard to the
combination of crime and defense, that "it cares not for the man,
except to punish him; and the punishment prescribed is to force him
to keep his promise, rather than to go to the penitentiary."100 As to the
question of the last moment at which the accused can purge himself
of his sin or, more realistically, choose between marriage and jail, the
court added that it should make no difference if "the seducer be forced
almost to the very doors of the penitentiary before offering to fulfill
his promise of marriage .... "91
In Wright v. State,9 2 another case in which the offer to marry was
made in open court,93 the district attorney immediately requested leave
to contest the good faith of the accused's offer before the prosecutrix
should give her answer to the dramatic proposal. This was granted, and
evidence was offered as to statements by the accused that he would
not marry the prosecutrix unless he were forced to do so, and even
then he would not live with her afterward. The prosecutrix then
declined the accused's offer, the court proceeded with the trial, and the
defendant was convicted. But on appeal the decision was reversed on
the ground that the statute stated simply that there must have been a
Id. at 816.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 31 Tex. Crim. 354, 20 SA.
756 (1892).
93 Although the names in this case and the preceding one, as well as the setting of the
proposal, were similar, they involved different states and different parties.
89
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marriage between the parties; it did not say that the marriage had to
last (or, in the sense of living together, even begin). This is reflected in
the statement that "When he [the accused] marries her, in the homely
language of olden times, 'he makes an honest woman of her.' He can
marry no other woman during her life without a divorce."0 4 The court
thus indicated that the purpose of the statute would be accomplished in
part simply through a marriage ceremony, regardless of whether the
accused refused to conduct himself as a husband in any way. It might
be concluded that the court felt since the accused had evidently testified
under oath that he would live with the prosecutrix, he would not want
to risk a possible perjury action if he did not. But it seemed more
concerned merely with his intention of going through a ceremony when
it pointed out that "of his good faith there can be no earthly doubt.
The penitentiary towering above him was the strongest guaranty of
the sincerity of his offer . . .95
It is obvious from both of the preceding cases that the court would
prefer the parties to marry rather than have to send one of them to jail.
It seems equally obvious that it is the act or ceremony of marriage with
which the courts are most concerned rather than whether there is any
possibility of establishing a stable life-long relationship between two
parties-in other words, a marriage. Such a view is placed in even
sharper focus by the result accomplished (with little judicial elaboration on the underlying rationale) in Burney v. State, 0 which presented
a fact situation not far removed from the hypothetical plight in which
we found Sam and Milgrig at the beginning of this article. The male
testified that he was forced into an automobile at gunpoint and then
driven to a sanitarium where the ostensible seducee was being cared
for. He went through a marriage ceremony with her after being advised
that if he did not do so his abductors would kill him. He did not live
with the prosecutrix after the ceremony, but returned to his home and
within several weeks had secured an annulment of the marriage based
on the duress at the time of the ceremony. The day after that judgment
was rendered, he was indicted for seduction. On appeal, it was held
that the action should have been dismissed because there had in fact
been a marriage ceremony between seducer and seducee, and this alone
was sufficient to meet the requirements of the statute. 07
94 Wright v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. 354, 20 S.W. 756, 757 (1892).
95 Ibid.

96 11 Tex. Crim. 599, 13 S.W.2d 375 (1929).
97 The court indicated that the decision would not vary according to whether such a
marriage was considered to be void or voidable. Id. at 376.
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Another line of cases reflect a more extensive concern for precisely
what interests are principally to be protected by the marriage-as-adefense statutes. For example in Combs v. Commonwealth,8 an appeal
was taken from a seduction conviction by a boy under twenty-one years
of age who asserted that he was ready and willing to marry the seducee
but that his father would not give the consent required for one of the
son's age. The Kentucky statute provided that it would be a defense if
the seducer "offers and is willing to marry" the seducee.0 9 The argument made for the accused was that he should be relieved from prosecution because he was willing to marry but unable to do so for reasons
beyond his control. The court pointed out that such a construction
"would have the practical effect of holding that boys under 21 years
of age may commit seduction with impunity." 100 But they considered
themselves caught in a dilemma because they believed that "to send
the boy to the reformatory will not afford an adequate remedy for the
seduced girl."10
' Explaining that the public policy behind the statute
was that "marriage of the parties to a seduction should be encouraged,'1 2 the court held that such a specific policy should override the
"general, broad expression . . .against marriage of minors without
parental consent."' 1 3 The case was therefore remanded with the instruction that the trial court advise the defendant that he could enter
into the marriage without parental consent, and if he renewed his
promise thereafter, the judgment of conviction would be suspended.
The problem of distinguishing between the purposes of and interests
to be protected by civil and criminal actions for seduction is probably
best illustrated by two decisions which involved one of the first cases
to deal with marriage as a defense to a seduction prosecution. The
defendant was first indicted in a criminal prosecution for fornication,
seduction, and bastardy. He was acquitted of the seduction charge
when he married the prosecutrix, but was nevertheless convicted of
the other charges even though they were based on the same general
course of conduct. 0 4 The father of the prosecutrix then brought a civil
98 283 S.W.2d 714 (Ky. 1955).
99 Ky. REV. STAT. § 436.010(2) (1963).
100 283 s.W.2d at 715.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid. In this regard, they cited as authority Commonwealth v. Wright, 16 Ky. L
Rep. 251, 27 S.W. 815 (1894).
103 283 S.V.2d at 715.
104 Commonwealth v. Eichar, 4 Clark (Pa. hJ. Rep.) 326 (1848). The child had been

born before the marriage took place and thus one purpose of the bastardy conviction
was to assure support.
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action for damages for seduction of his daughter. 05 A key defense raised
in this subsequent action was that the plaintiff's damages should be
limited wholly to loss of services on the theory that the act of marrying
should have atoned for any possible insult or loss of family honor. Both
trial and appellate courts held that the marriage ceremony could be
considered by the jury in mitigation of damages, but that it did not
bar an exemplary or punitive award. The Supreme Court stated that
the argument raised by the defendant
assumes that the marriage of a debauched daughter with her
seducer, must be accepted in all cases as a full atonement for the
mental anguish endured by the parent; for the insult to his honorable feelings; for the deep distress which may overwhelm the
family circle, because of the indelible disgrace inflicted upon one
of its members; and for the irretrievable loss of social position.
Marriage, though tardy, may, in many instances, alleviate these
wrongs but it cannot, in any, entirely compensate them.1 00
The opinion in the civil action also pointed out that the legislature
had not intended to interfere with the existing civil remedy when they
made seduction a crime, and that the two actions were entirely independent. They added that "the object of one proceeding is to vindicate
the public peace and dignity; of the other, to avenge an individual
07
injury by the infliction of heavy pecuniary damages."'
The preceding decisions are only a few of those which have dealt
with problems of marriage or a renewed offer to marry as a defense in
seduction or other actions involving voluntary sexual intercourse between unmarried persons. Not all states will go so far as to construe
these statutes to include merely an offer to marry, and the problem of
an impediment to marriage may create great difficulties for other
states. 108 But the expression of the basic purpose of the defense as either
encouraging or forcing a marriage between legally competent parties
seems to pervade the decisions. The courts are no doubt aware that a
marriage forced under such circumstances usually has only minimal
105 Eichar v. Kistler, 14 Pa. 282 (1850). By this time the daughter had obtained a
divorse a mensa et thoro with an award to her of alimony.
106 Id. at 285.

107

Id. at 286.

108

For an example of one state's problem in dealing with the argument that the

marriage promise was unenforceable because the parties were of different races and
therefore barred from intermarrying, see Wood v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 963, 166 S.E.
477 (1932), discussed in Wadlington, The Loving Case: Virginia's Anti-Miscegenation
Statute in Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REV. 1189, 1204-05 (1966).
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prospect for long term existence, but this community interest is evidently considered as only secondary.
THE LEGAL SHOTGUN-DANGEROUS ANACHRONISMI
IN A BRAVE NE w WORLD
In our study thus far we have seen how a great many of our laws
dealing with sexual intercourse between unmarried parties-particularly in the context of what we can loosely term "the courtship process"-have been consciously oriented toward or have in fact served to
encourage or force marriage between parties who indulge in such
conduct. Many would now urge that nearly all legal sanctions against
seduction and fornication should be eliminated because they do not
conform to present-day moral and social reality.10 D Such a goal may
well be achieved if the spirit of the ALI draft on consensual sexual
relations between unmarried persons1 0 begins to move state legislators
sufficiently, though there is presently no detectable trace of any largescale action of this sort. But equally important for us to consider along
with changes in social attitudes is the evolution of new institutions and
approaches in the family law field which deal much more broadly with
109 This imbalance is particularly evident with regard to the crime of fornication,
which usually involves simply a question of whether two single parties did in fact have
sexual intercourse. Whether such an act was right or wrong or justified because of the
good faith or strong passions of the parties is irrelevant in such a prosecution. But
occasionally the attitudes of the courts (and probably of the bulk of the community)
with regard to the social quality of the act comes out in a judicial opinion. The most
likely vehicle for such a determination is the judicial determination of whether a party
is "of good moral character" as required for naturalization. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3) (1964).
The opinion in Petition of Rudder, 56 F. Supp. 969 (D. Mass. 1944), provides an illustration of this. An alien petitioning for naturalization had married a man in the good faith
belief that he was unmarried. In fact, he and his prior wife had been divorced by a
Mexican decree obtained while both were domiciled in Massachusetts and without the
presence of either in Mexico. Although it was considered that the divorce was not valid
in Massachusetts and that the petitioner would thus be guilty of fornication under the
laws of that State by continuing to live with the man whom she had married, the court
stated that in the particular context in which their power had been invoked, a mechanical
interpretation was unnecessary: the legislature had invited the judiciary "to concern
themselves not only with the technicalities of the criminal law, but also with the
norms of society and the way average men of good will act .... " In such a frame of
reference, the court failed to see that the petitioner had "done anything which the
community regards as reprehensible." The petition for citizenship was thus granted. In
the same regard, see Petitions of Rudder, 159 F.2d 695 (2d Cir. 1947), wherein the court
said, "Morality is not to be measured solely by conventional formality, nor are the mores
of a community static. The trend of recent naturalization decisions is to stress stability
and faithfulness in the 'marital' relationship rather than the mere legality of ties .... "
Id. at 697. See generally, Schmidt v. United States, 177 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1949).
110 See notes 62-64 supra and accompanying text.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1967

19

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [1967], Art. 3

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1: 183

the fundamental problems of courtship in particular and sexual relations in general. Our rigid categorization in terms of contract, tort and
crime too often have produced the situation in which anachronistic
laws have remained unchanged in a general reform largely because the
legislative drafters felt that they fit under some other heading.' This
has been particularly prevalent in the now dynamic field of family law,
which for years was regarded more as a "how to" than a "why to" field
both by lawyers and law teachers.
The laws dealing with intercourse between unmarried persons provide an excellent illustration of how such problems have been shaped.
We have seen how in the seventeenth century the crime of fornication
might be met with an injunction that the fornicators join in marriage.
Then, through a period of several centuries, the evolution of new and
severe criminal sanctions against seduction generally coincided with
the amelioration of those against fornication. Late in the period, the
long standing private actions for breach of promise, seduction, and
related acts were greatly restricted and in some instances abolished.
We can thus generalize fairly safely by saying that the trend of the
criminal statutes has been toward minimal sanctions against nonmarital
sexual relations so long as the parties consent freely and not on the
basis of a marriage promise. The situations which now are most likely
to produce serious criminal prosecution are those in which both parties
to the sexual act contemplate marriage at the time, or in which the
female party contemplates marriage and is lead to believe that she is
justified in this by the male who in reality has no such plans. And we
can add that the remaining criminal sanctions often are no longer
complemented by corresponding private actions for redress.
Even without consideration of changing social attitudes over the last
century, or the development of family law approaches to solving problems dealing with sex and family through other than the traditional
categories mentioned earlier, we can see that legal approaches to fornication and particularly seduction have been affected by confusion
over just what type of sanction should be applied to accomplish what
goals. For example, if it is the purpose of a tort or contract action to
provide individual relief between two persons, as contrasted with the
purpose of a criminal sanction to provide redress for an offense against
the community at large, it seems inconsistent that many states have
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eliminated the former modes for relief in the case of seduction or
breach of promise while the criminal sanction for virtually the same
conduct has been retained. The analogy in one sense would be to the
case of a person who had been struck in the face intentionally by another without excuse. Abolishing the tort action for recovery of damages of any sort, whether for doctor's fees or loss of wages, would not
serve to provide the necessary personal redress even if we continued to
maintain the criminal action for assault and battery. To carry the
analogy a bit further, if we were to abolish the action in tort while
retaining the criminal sanction but to provide that paying doctor's
bills would be a defense to any prosecution, we would in fact be likely
to encourage the antisocial conduct for those who could financially
afford it. Two parallels can be drawn to the elimination of a.civil action
for breach of promise or seduction and the maintenance of a criminal
action for seduction with marriage as a defense. The first of these is
the likelihood of seduction being encouraged if the seducer knows that
no criminal sanctions will attach if he reneges on his promise initially,
providing he is willing to go through with a marriage eventually if the
only alternative is jail. The second is that we might consider that not
only is seduction itself undesirable, but that in effect requiring marriage under threat of a criminal sanction is likely to produce a socially
undesirable union which may ultimately generate further problems
through a probable broken home. The statutes which merely hold
prosecution in abeyance for a certain period are perhaps the worst of
all in this respect because the possibility of a limbo period of a marriage
which was entered into for the sake of convenience but which may
nevertheless be productive of offspring, holds forth the possibility of
future problems not only for the wife but for the children and the
state. If we are going to make seduction a crime--and a serious one at
that-why should marriage be a defense at all? Although it might be
considered by a court in mitigation of punishment in some circumstances, marrying simply to avoid prosecution may in some instances
be a greater offense against society than the seduction.
To a great extent, our present law dealing with seduction reflects
both confusion as to the exact problem or problems to be solved, and
our conditioned response of looking to sanctions such as imprisonment
or money damages (or even marriage) as the only available tools for the
solution of these problems. For example, one court may see the problem not as impairment of the seducee's future nubility but of assuring
that a seduced, unmarried female will in fact be married to the seducer
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at the time of the child's birth in order that he will be legitimate. This
approach ignores the possibility of using what might be more effective
alternatives including adoptive placement, improvement in existing
paternity or legitimacy statutes, better dissemination of information on
contraceptive methods, or even abortion, as alternatives either in a
specific situation or as a preventive for future difficulties (which, in
some sense, a criminal prosecution is designed to accomplish). What we
need is creative thought and action (not limited to the past legal framework) to deal with the whole area of courtship and to assure that the
overlooked but most important goal of marital stability is achieved in
as many cases as possible.
The legal shotgun approach seems to be at odds conceptually with at
least two important recent developments in our law. One of these is the
movement toward a "breakdown" approach to divorce, which recognizes that it is in the interests of society that a marriage ended in fact
should be terminated (or at least terminable) by law. Certainly this
seems contradictory to forcing a legal union which has virtually no
chance of ever becoming a marriage in fact, or of forcing the continued
legal existence of such a non-union through the threat of renewed
prosecution.
The other inconsistent development, which undercuts one of the
basic premises on which the early criminal seduction laws were based,
has been the rapid move toward providing equal rights for women in
nearly all areas (with certain obvious biological exceptions). It is no
longer valid to assume that all women have led sheltered lives and that
they are the weaker sex in general. Modern woman occupies a worldly
role not dreamed of at the inception of most seduction laws, and it
may well be modem man who is most likely to need protection, even
without the added weapon of the legal shotgun.
It would be difficult to determine accurately just how often the
criminal seduction statutes are used today as a wedge or a bludgeon.
But it must be acknowledged that their very presence-particularly if
marriage is a defense which can only be effective if it takes place before
indictment or trial-makes them subject to almost all of the concerns
which lead to frequent abolition or severe restriction of their tort
counterpart through anti-heart balm legislation several decades ago.
These criminal laws are clearly an anachronism, and the possibility of
their use for socially undesirable ends far outweighs what very limited
usefulness they might still be considered to have.
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